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It’s	education,	stupid:	How	globalisation	has	made
education	the	new	political	cleavage	in	Europe
Several	recent	European	elections,	as	well	as	the	UK’s	referendum	on	Brexit,	have
produced	a	clear	split	in	voting	choices	between	citizens	with	different	levels	of
education.	Mark	Bovens	and	Anchrit	Wille	argue	that	a	new	political	cleavage	in
Europe	has	emerged	between	citizens	with	high	levels	of	education	and	those	with
lower	levels	of	educational	attainment,	with	the	former	group	more	likely	to	support
green	and	liberal	parties,	and	the	latter	drawn	toward	nationalism.
Credit:	Zason	Smith	Photography	(CC	BY-NC-SA	2.0)
The	Brexit	referendum,	and	the	Dutch	and	French	elections,	have	shown	that	the	traditional	distinction	between
right	and	left	is	becoming	obsolete.	Commentators	argue	that	a	globalisation	cleavage	is	appearing	in	western
Europe,	with	the	issues	of	migration	and	European	integration	core	bones	of	contention.	We	argue	that	at	a
deeper	level	it	is	not	just	globalisation	or	the	EU	that	drives	this	contestation.	The	new	political	divide	is	also
rooted	in	demographic	changes,	it	is	a	manifestation	of	the	rise	of	a	more	structural,	educational	cleavage.	It’s	no
longer	just	the	economy,	stupid,	it’s	education.
Tell	us	what	your	highest	diploma	is,	and	we	will	tell	you	who	you	are	and	what	you	do.	If	you	are	a	university
graduate,	you	will	watch	public	television,	such	as	the	BBC	or	its	equivalent	in	other	European	countries	(such	as
Canvas	in	Belgium)	and	read	‘quality’	papers,	such	as	The	Guardian,	Die	Zeit,	or	Libération.	You	will	do	your
utmost	to	get	your	children	into	public	school	in	the	UK,	a	Gymnasium	in	Germany	and	the	Netherlands,	or	one	of
the	Grandes	écoles	in	France.	You	will	live	in	a	university	town,	a	green	pre-war	suburb,	or	in	the	19th	century,
gentrified	parts	of	the	inner	cities,	such	as	Prenslauer	Berg	in	Berlin,	De	Pijp	in	Amsterdam,	or	Notting	Hill	in
London.	You	will	be	moderately	in	favour	of	the	EU,	worry	about	climate	change,	the	state	of	higher	education,
and	xenophobia,	and	vote	for	a	Green	or	social	liberal	party.
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On	the	other	hand,	if	your	education	ended	after	junior	high	school	or	primary	vocational	training,	the	chances	are
you	will	watch	commercial	television,	such	as	SBS,	VTM	or	ITV,	and	read	tabloid	papers	–	if	you	read	any
newspaper	at	all	–	such	as	The	Sun	in	England,	Bild	in	Germany,	or	BT	in	Denmark.	Your	children	will	attend	a
local	state	school	in	the	UK,	a	large	ROC	in	the	Netherlands,	or	a	lycée	professionnel	in	France.	You	will	live	in
former	industrial	areas	and	manufacturing	towns,	in	post-war	satellite	cities,	such	as	Marzahn	in	Berlin,	Lelystad
in	the	Netherlands,	or	Slough	in	England,	or	in	the	20th	century	outskirts	of	the	major	cities.	You	will	be	highly
sceptical	about	the	EU,	worry	about	crime	and	immigration,	and	vote	for	a	nationalist	party,	or	perhaps	not	at	all.
In	our	new	study,	Diploma	Democracy:	The	Rise	of	Political	Meritocracy,	we	show	how	the	contours	of	this	new
divide	have	crystallised	in	western	and	northern	Europe.	Using	a	broad	notion	of	cleavage,	we	find	the	rise	of	an
educational	cleavage	reflected	along	three	lines:	a	new	socio-demographic	division,	differences	in	terms	of
political	preferences,	and	the	appearance	of	a	new	divide	in	the	political	landscape.
The	rise	of	the	well-educated	as	a	new	social	segment
Cleavages	are	rooted	in	demography.	For	a	large	part	of	the	twentieth	century	it	made	little	sense	to	speak	of
distinct	educational	groups,	because	the	group	of	well-educated	citizens	was	so	small.	This	changed	as	a
consequence	of	rising	educational	attainment	levels.	In	2015,	according	to	the	OECD,	27	per	cent	of	the	EU
workforce	(using	a	group	of	22	EU	countries)	was	well	educated	–	more	than	double	the	11	per	cent	who
classified	as	well-educated	EU	citizens	in	1992	and	more	than	twenty-five	times	higher	than	the	meagre	1	per
cent	recorded	in	the	1960s.	This	massive	expansion	of	the	number	of	well-educated	citizens	provides	the
demographic	basis	for	cleavage	formation.
This	emerging	educational	segmentation	comes	with	an	increased	stratification	and	segregation	along
educational	lines,	with	unequal	access	to	housing,	health	and	job	opportunities.	Moreover,	education	is	an
important	driver	of	new	patterns	of	homogamy.	The	well	educated	and	the	less	well	educated	live	in	different
social	worlds	and	do	not	mingle.	They	differ	in	health,	in	life	expectancies,	in	wealth,	and	in	income.
Cosmopolitans	versus	nationalists
Traditionally,	most	voters	in	western	Europe	can	be	positioned	along	a	social-economic,	left–right	dimension	and
along	a	religious–secular	dimension.	In	addition	to	these	traditional	conflict	dimensions,	which	reach	back	to	the
late	nineteenth	and	early	twentieth	century,	a	new	cultural	conflict	dimension	has	manifested	itself	in	the	past
three	decades.	The	crucial	themes	along	this	cultural	dimension	are	immigration,	globalisation,	and	European
integration.	This	new	division	between	what	could	be	called	‘cosmopolitans’	and	‘nationalists’	has	emerged
gradually,	fuelled	by	the	waves	of	non-western	immigration	and	the	process	of	European	unification.
This	division	between	cosmopolitan	and	nationalist	attitudes	coincides	in	western	European	countries	with	the
education	divide.	Ranged	on	one	side	of	this	new	line	of	conflict	are	the	citizens	who	accept	social	and	cultural
heterogeneity	and	who	favour,	or	at	least	condone,	multiculturalism.	These	are	the	more	highly	educated.	On	the
other	side	are	citizens	who	are	highly	critical	of	multiculturalism	and	who	prefer	a	more	homogeneous	national
culture.	These	are	predominantly	citizens	with	lower	education	levels.
For	example,	in	the	2016	Brexit	referendum	in	the	UK,	strong	educational	differences	could	be	observed.	With	the
exception	of	Scotland,	the	Leave	vote	was	much	higher	in	those	regions	of	Britain	populated	by	citizens	with	low
education	qualifications,	and	much	lower	in	those	regions	with	a	larger	number	of	university	graduates.	According
to	Matthew	Goodwin	and	Oliver	Heath:	‘fifteen	of	the	20	“least	educated”	areas	voted	to	leave	the	EU	while	every
single	one	of	the	20	“most	educated”	areas	voted	to	remain.’
The	rise	of	social-liberal	versus	nationalist	parties
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Cleavages	manifest	themselves	also	in	the	support	for	specific	political	parties.	New	parties	with	new	types	of
preferences	have	recently	entered	the	political	stage	across	Europe.	On	the	one	side	of	the	new	cultural
dimension	of	conflict,	we	see	the	emergence	of	Green	and	social	liberal	parties,	such	as	Groen!	and	Ecolo	in
Belgium,	Les	Verts	in	France,	The	Greens	in	Germany,	D66	and	GroenLinks	in	the	Netherlands,	and	the	Liberal
Democrats	in	the	United	Kingdom,	to	name	but	a	few.	Since	the	late	seventies,	they	have	become	established
political	actors	throughout	western	Europe.	In	all	countries,	the	Green	and	social	liberal	parties	predominantly
attract	voters	from	the	high	end	of	the	education	spectrum,	as	shown	in	Figure	1.
Figure	1:	Link	between	education	and	support	for	Green	and	Left-liberal	parties	(2014)
Note:	The	chart	shows	the	percentage	of	people	who	had	voted	for	selected	Green	and	Left-liberal	parties	in	the	previous
election	from	different	educational	groups.	Figures	are	compiled	using	the	2014	European	Social	Survey.
On	the	other	side	of	this	cultural	conflict,	we	see	the	emergence	of	nationalist	populist	parties	such	as	the	FPÖ	in
Austria,	Vlaams	Belang	and	NV-A	in	Belgium,	the	Danish	People’s	Party,	the	Finns	Party,	France’s	Front
National,	the	AfD	in	Germany,	Lega	Nord	in	Italy,	the	Party	for	Freedom	in	the	Netherlands,	the	Sweden
Democrats,	and	UKIP.	These	nationalist	parties	tend	to	draw	large	proportions	of	the	low	and	medium-educated
voters,	and	relatively	few	well-educated	voters	as	shown	in	Figure	2	below.
Figure	2:	Link	between	education	and	support	for	nationalist	parties	(2014)
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Note:	The	chart	shows	the	percentage	of	people	who	had	voted	for	selected	nationalist	parties	in	the	previous	election	from
different	educational	groups.	Figures	are	compiled	using	the	2014	European	Social	Survey.
Political	contestation	regarding	globalisation	issues	should	thus	be	understood	as	only	part	of	the	puzzle.
Underneath	it,	the	contours	of	an	educational	cleavage	have	become	visible.	Educational	differences	matter	most
in	societies	that	are	meritocratic	–	in	which	access	to	higher	education,	the	labour	market,	and	social	stratification
are	based	on	merit	instead	of	class	or	patronage.
This	is	particularly	the	case	in	western	and	northern	European	countries,	such	as	Belgium,	Denmark,	and	to	a
somewhat	lesser	extent	the	Netherlands,	the	UK,	Finland,	Austria,	and	Switzerland.	In	these	countries,	the
contours	of	something	resembling	a	full	educational	cleavage	are	visible.	The	nationalist	populist	parties	on	the
one	hand,	and	the	Greens	and	social-liberals	on	the	other	hand,	embody	the	institutionalisation	of	this	new
political	conflict	line.	They	have	gained	a	lasting	place	in	the	political	arena	because	they	represent	groups	of
voters	who	not	only	share	a	particular	set	of	issue	attitudes,	but	also	specific	social	characteristics	–	their
educational	background.
Mark	Bovens	and	Anchrit	Wille	are	the	authors	of	Diploma	Democracy:	The	Rise	of	Political	Meritocracy	(Oxford
University	Press	2017)
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
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Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	and	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy,
nor	of	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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